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The political change in the 1980’es and 1990’es in the Black Sea Region has introduced many questions 
regarding its future as the region faces massive problems like conflicts on territory, drop of production levels in 
the 1990’es and related poverty, and last but not the least, environmental problems. The size of the region also 
blurs the picture. However, briefly there are three major influences that mark the future development of the 
region: globalization, regionalization and Euro-Asian integration. 
We propose that under these three influences, a new global integration zone, consisting of multiple networks 
between cities of the Black Sea Region is emerging. Our proposition that a new global integration zone is 
emerging within the Black Sea Region depends on three assumptions: Our first assumption is that neo-liberal 
globalization and regionalization (and particularly Euro-Asian integration) lead to development of similar 
political changes in the region. Our second assumption is that neo-liberal globalization and regionalization lead 
to development of similar spatial socio-economic developments within the Black Sea Region which brings some 
cities to the fore to gain power in the national and global organization of production. Our third assumption is that 
there is increasing trans-national integration between subject cities. 
Emergence of such a zone is perhaps most important for policy makers at the local level who have to face either 
positive or negative on-site effects of globalization and regionalization. Increasing socio-economic inequalities, 
excessive agglomeration of economic activities and population, diversification of population and increasing 
complexity of problems cripple traditional city management and planning practices in these countries which 
have a strong central planning and administration background. 
Due to practical reasons, we limit our study to integration of two sub-national regions, the province of Istanbul, 
and the province of Odessa. Province of Istanbul may be recalled as Greater Istanbul, or Istanbul Metropolitan 
City since due to change in the administrative legislation at 2004. Province of Odessa includes the city of Odessa 
as well as other cities within the province. 
We may conclude that there is progressive convergence in the political grounds between Turkey-Ukraine and 
Istanbul-Odessa, mainly in the framework of the global structures that are predominantly part of the Euro-
Atlantic supra-structure.  Though there is not much evidence of similarity in spatial development of Istanbul and 
Odessa, particularly due to political inclarity and problems of administrative decentralization in Ukraine, there is 
evidence of economic and social integration, between Turkey-Ukraine and Istanbul-Odessa, which experiences 
slow development, and negative side effects like informal activities.  
As a conclusion we may argue that integration of two regions might heavily depend on the Ukrainian foreign and 
domestic policies, and the decisions of supra-national structures like the World Trade Organization and EU. We 
may expect a progress in economic integration by the removal of trade barriers, where Istanbul and Odessa  
would be direct beneficiaries as both production and transfer centres. Further administrative decentralization in 
Ukraine might lead to a re-population in Odessa Region, as happened in Istanbul after the 1980 period. 
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Introduction  
This study questions the emergence of a global integration zone within the Western Black Sea 
Region, which might in future become a  part of the polycentric European Urban System. 
The fragmented geography and society of the Black Sea Region, has perhaps had one of its 
most important transition period during the last fifteen years. The borders were blurred again, 
long neglected neighbours started knocking at each other’s door, and influences of 
globalization diffused quickly to the region. 
The political change in the region since end of 1980’es has introduced many concerns about 
the future. Conflicts on territory, sharp drop of production levels in the 1990’es, poverty, 
international migration and environmental problems draw a complicated picture of the region. 
The vast size of the area and high level of historical connections to the whole Euro-Asian 
space makes it even a more complicated panorama. Yet, briefly there are three major 
influences that mark the future development of the region: globalization, regionalization and 
Euro-Asian integration.   
By globalization we refer to neo-liberal globalization which is characterized by de-
nationalization of economy, deregulations, decentralization of state authority, the re-
organization of production and the transformation of the world cities into global cities, 
following Teeple (2001), Sassen (1991, 1994), Hall (1999) and others.  
Regionalization could be interpreted as an outcome of globalization due to the need of a 
higher capacity management system at local levels, as management becomes more 
complicated and requires new abilities and skills as local systems integrate to the global 
system. Emergence of trans-national regional systems at the expense of national production 
systems promote a different logic that requires inter-regional relations and network-type 
organizations that overwhelm national boundaries (Cappellin, 1993, Herschell and 
Newman, 2002). 
Euro-Asian integration is the most solid and well defined influence on our study area. First of 
all, it could be viewed as a result of the first two influences, globalization and regionalization. 
Second, it contains long term policy targets that have significant influences on the transition 
of the Black Sea Region. We pay particular attention to European Spatial Development 
Perspective  (ESDP, 1999), European Cohesion Policy for 2007-2013 (CEC,2005), and 
scenarios that rely on the development of a polycentric urban system within the European 
space (Mehlbye, 2000, Waterhout, 2002). 
Thus, we have three influences that reshape grounds for policy at the supra-national, national 
and sub-national regional levels within the Black Sea Region, that is important for our study.  
We propose that a global integration zone is emerging, consisting of multiple networks 
between cities of the Black Sea Region. Our proposition depends on three assumptions: first, 
neo-liberal globalization and regionalization (and particularly Euro-Asian integration) lead to 
the development of similar political changes within the region. Second, these influences also 
lead to similar spatial socio-economic  developments within the Black Sea Region, promoting 
some of the cities to a better position in the global and national system of cities. Our third 
assumption is that there should be increasing trans-national integration between cities of the 
Black Sea Region. These cities attract significant amounts of FDI from neighbouring 
countries as well as from developed countries and establish multiple links with other cities 
within the trans-national region, as globalization, regionalization and Euro-Asian integration 
implies.      2
The emergence of such a global integration zone is particularly important for a number of 
reasons. First of all, it alters the problem of handling the Euro-Asian integration in the longer 
run. It might decrease risks related to stability in the region, and foster economic development 
to decrease regional inequalities at the continental scale. However, it also introduces problems 
that work counter wise, as illegal immigration continues, regional inequalities at the national 
scale strengthens as well as social segregation increases. Over agglomeration of economic 
activities and related environmental problems also pose a challenge.  
Another reason is that policy makers at the local levels have still little knowledge on the 
influences of globalization and regionalization. Though trans-national relations within the 
Black Sea Region has particular effects on the development of metropolitan areas, there has 
been little interest to understand the long term trends in the region. The countries of the region 
have long had traditional centralized planning systems, which is changing recently. These 
systems have introduced other problems in management of the city and crippled strategy 
development and implementation at the local level. As an instance, Istanbul has missed an 
important opportunity in the 1990’es due to the lack of a strategic approach that would help 
the city benefit the change within the region. The inferiority of such planning systems in 
Istanbul have also been proved even before 1980’es (Geniş, 2004, Keyder and Öncü, 1993). 
Thus, today it is of critical importance to understand trends at global, trans-national regional 
and subnational levels for local governments to be successful.  
The study area we focus on imposes particular difficulties due to vast size of the region, lack 
of data especially at the inter-city relations or micro-economic actors. Complexity of the 
relationships also impose limitations to the study. Current changes in the legislative and 
administrative systems of the subject countries and cities also limit the scope of our study. 
Thus, we limit our study with descriptive statistics and policy evaluation. We take province of 
Istanbul and Odessa oblast as relevant regions, though there are some basic differences within 
the comparison. However, sister-city agreements at different levels increase the consistency of 
this type of definiton of regions. Recent administrative changes in Istanbul also makes it a 
meaningful comparison. 
As a first step, we draw a brief historical perspective of regional integration and disintegration 
within the Black Sea Region (King, 2004, Ascherson, 1996). Second, we try to evaluate the 
processes of globalization and regionalization and expected outcomes for local systems within 
the Black Sea Region following Fukuyama (2004, Stiglitz (2002) , and Sassen 
(2001,2000,1994). Third, we try to evaluate the relationship between Istanbul (Turkey) and 
Odessa (Ukraine) providing supra-national and national level political, economic and cultural 
grounds for establishing horizontal relationships at the local levels.   
Following the results, we may claim that a new global integration zone is emerging as the 
relationship between two cities is flourishing based on supra-national level political 
backgrounds. However, the pace of integration is slow, due to a variety of obstacles such as 
the  ongoing transformation process. As a conclusion, we try to provide future prospects for a 
sustainable development of the Black Sea Region in the context of Euro-Asian integration. 
We believe that the quality of the current integration deserves further research to provide 
intelligence for strategic planning works of the cities in the Black Sea Region. 
 
1. The initial integration and disintegration within the Black Sea Region  
Following Amin and Thrift, (2002), we provide a short history of regional integration within 
the Black Sea Region, to understand the development of both cities reading the imprints of the 
past footsteps. Though the history of interregional trade dates back to ancient Greeks, it is 
possible to say that highest level of regional integration in the Black Sea Region was first   3
achieved after the 15th century, which also had a high level of integration with the 
Mediterranean space, due to Ottoman Empire’s expansion and the conquest of the critical city 
of then Constantinople at 1453. By the 16th century, Black Sea was wholly integrated due to 
the expansion of the empire (King, 2004). In this period, Istanbul was the largest city in the 
world (Mumford, 1961),  as it was both the administrative, economic and cultural capital of 
the vast region that covered a third of the Mediterranean and the whole Black Sea Region.  
However, development of a rival city, St. Petersburg, and the expansion of Russian Empire 
changed the picture by the 17th and 18th centuries. Istanbul, suffering from the overall 
underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire and loss of land lost its importance during these 
centuries. New ports like Constanza and Odessa became rivals for the city. At the 19th 
century, Istanbul was rivalled by Odessa (Ascherson, 1996, King, 2004). This was a period 
of continuing disintegration within the empire, and loss of Egypt also further fuelled the 
disintegration process between Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.   Thus, Istanbul’s 
relative position marginalized while a bunch of world cities elsewhere in the world 
increasingly integrated within the new larger global space.  
  Meanwhile Odessa was flourishing. Established at 1794 at Khadzibei (Hacıbey), Odessa 
became a free trade area during 1819 and 1858. Following conflicts between Europe, Russia 
and Ottoman Empire, new trade arrangements were made and a re-integration to European 
economy started. Both at Odessa and at Edirne – Dedeağaç (Alexandroupolis) railways were 
built to enable transfer of grains and oil to Europe.  At 1894 Odessa became the 4th largest 
city of the Russian Empire, after St. Petersburg, Moscow and Varsaw (ABD and AUB,2005). 
Both Istanbul and Odessa became interlinked with international passenger ferries and 
attracted European businessmen and tourists for another 20 year. Thus, we may interpret this 
era as an initial integration era with the European space in the industrial age.  
The conflicts and wars at the beginning of the 20th century and establishment of the Soviet 
Union have once again fragmented the Black Sea Region, that established a larger system 
from Eastern Europe to Asia. Moscow became the major dominant city within this system. 
Establishment of Republic of Turkey and promotion of Ankara as the capital at 1924 has put 
Istanbul into an even marginal position,  ending its primacy in the Black Sea Region that 
lasted for 16 hundred years (Keyder and Öncü, 1924). After the World War II, Black Sea 
was not a region but rather a border, especially between the Euro-Atlantic Block and the Iron 
curtain.   
During the post World War II period and until recently, Istanbul did not attract the attention of 
scholars that focused either in the European city systems or global or world cities. It has not 
also been much of interest within studies related to third world or underdeveloped countries, 
probably because problems that cities like Sao Paolo, Mexico City or Calcutta were huge 
related to those in Istanbul.   
Istanbul, under conditions of an import substitution policy, remained as a national primary 
city until the political changes of 1980. Turkey’s policy change in favor of international trade, 
export oriented industrialization and liberalization has opened Istanbul once again to the 
influences of world system. Short after, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and political 
change within the the Eastern block introduced a new era of disintegration and re-integration 
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2. Globalization and Re-integration within the Black Sea Region 
2.1. Globalization and regionalization  
The rise of international trade after 1970’es, opening up of national economies to international 
trade, emergence of a post-fordist production, increasing flows of capital, information, goods, 
energy and people through technological innovations are the ingredients of globalisation. 
According to Thomas (1997), “globalisation refers broadly to the process whereby power is 
located in global social formations and expressed through global networks rather than 
through territorially-based states”. According to Teeple, (2000), “Globalization can be 
defined as the unfolding resolution of the contradiction between ever expanding capital and 
its national political and social formations”.   
Teeple, (2000), argues that some sceptics about globalisation ask what the difference of 
globalisation is while such transactions merely return to the rates of the late nineteenth 
century. However, there are fundamental changes in the mode of production, change in the 
capital ownership and the speed of such transactions. While until 1970’es much of the capital 
accumulated in the international trade was originally national, after 1980 a trans-national 
capital ownership has emerged. Another shift is also fundamental to globalisation, that is the 
rise of advanced services, which enable such transactions, enhance highly complex research 
and development projects and competitiveness. A consequent effect of this change is the shift 
of power from the traditional middle class of the nation-state that is formed by national firm’s 
labourer to the new middle class  of the trans-national capital’s information worker. As firms 
in these sectors do, this new class concentrates in only a few locations, where global cities 
emerge. 
Ryner (2002) concludes that globalisation project aims to deepen and extend 
commodification of social life and to universalise a form of social integration that is based on 
the logic of self-regulating markets. He argues that though strong forces are working for the 
formation of such markets, its institutional stability is not yet assured.  
The discontents about neo-liberal globalization prevails especially from these self-regulating 
market logic. It has been understood that as centrally planned national economies transform 
into self-regulating open markets, and as government power is reduced, local economies 
become more exposed to external shocks. The collapse of Third World Countries’ economies 
at the end of the 1970’es and the beginning of 1980’es due to high public deficits has 
provided the reason for the establishment of the ‘Washington Consensus’, which aimed at 
shrinking the size and role of developing countries’ nation state, through de-regulations and 
financial liberation,  and  strengthening the state in other fields. Unfortunately the result was 
further shrinking of the state, and loosing capacity that was crucial for managing global 
shocks  (Fukuyama, 2004). That is where discontents on globalization and particularly 
Washington Consensus arouse among people, as well as politicians, intellectuals, and even 
academicians like Stiglitz (2002).  
Regionalization has emerged at the post 1980 period. Increasing Asian competition, 
development of flexible production systems and the removal of borders have all necessitated 
to form regional production systems, that took place on a trans-national space. Trans-national 
regions did not constitute of rigid geographic borders, but for any production system they 
could be re-defined flexibly. We may conclude that part of the rise of the trans-national 
regions depends on the concepts in Porter’s (1990) book ‘Competitive Advantage of Nations’ 
where he argues firms do not achieve a competitive status only with their internal capabilities, 
but the conditions and the possibilities provided by the country where they are located in help 
in enhancing its competitiveness. In an age where national economies fragmented and the 
importance of regional production systems were understood in Europe even in the 1980’es,   5
the repercussions of this approach were ‘Regional Competition’ (Cappellin 1993), and to an 
extent, ‘Competition of Cities’, as proposed in the study of Lever (1999).  Thus, the need for 
developing competitive advantage at the regional and the city level was well understood in the 
1990’es, especially in Europe which suffered seriously from the competitive Eastern Asian-
particularly Japanese- and USA economies.  
We may view European Union as a wide scale capacity building project at the supra-national 
level, which eventually depends on the establishment of supra-national, national and trans-
national regional structures that enhance competitive advantages of the continent, to fill in the 
gaps that arouse from de-nationalization and de-regulations.   Interregional co-operation 
enables establishment of flexible relationships between these regions that give rise to trans-
national regions as means of spatial production units. That is why Europe is now considered 
as ‘Europe of Regions’, which implies that European Union’s existence depends on highly 
competitive regional systems which are formed by networks between cities that are 
interconnected with multiple linkages (Herrschel and Newman, 2002).  
Thus, European Union’s approach on regions and cities, and thus its capacity concerns on 
local governance have also strong implications for the countries of the Black Sea Region, 
which promote Euro-Atlantic policies for almost a decade and a half (except Turkey which 
has been involved within the system early in the post WWII period).  
1990’es started with the collapse of socialist production systems in the Euro-Asian geography. 
Sharp losses of production, increased poverty, illegal activities, out migration and conflicts 
sparkled in the Balkans, the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus and the Middle Asia. Together 
with the collapse of national production systems, institutional capabilities of governments 
were also crippled through rapid transition to market economies. While some of the Central 
and Eastern European countries could integrate to European economy, in the Balkans and the 
Black Sea  Region still there are a variety of problems on going. 
Turkey itself particularly experienced institutional capacity problems even before 1980’es in 
dealing with local problems like excessive migration and illegal housing. Post 1980 period did 
enhance the metropolitanisation and polarization processes within the country. Financial de-
regulations, privatizations and shrinking of the state did not prevent public deficits or global 
shocks, while they fragmented the national production system to reconnect to world economy. 
Turkey experienced bitter economic shocks during the post 1990 period, which went hand in 
hand with increasing concentration of poverty in the metropolitan cities. Istanbul was where 
income inequalities sharply rose and socio-economic problems continued to grow as the city’s 
economy expanded under neo-liberal policies (Geniş, 2004, Güvenç, 2000). Decentralization 
of governance to the local level could not itself alone solve most of the problems as expected 
(Keyder and Öncü, 1993).  The need for a better and higher management capacity at the 
local level prevailed. 
 
2.2. Expected outcomes of globalization and regionalization within the black sea region  
At once, the problems in the Black Sea Region to integrate to contemporary global system 
seems to rise basically on supra-national and national level problems. However, there is a 
need to focus also on relationships at trans-national regional levels to understand the trends 
within the region. Development of city-regions, polycentric city systems and the 
transformation of cities themselves provide the basis for our interest : the  emergence of a new 
global integration zone within the Black Sea Region.    6
The Transformation of World Cities into Global Cities 
Globalization is generally discussed in two different literature groups. “International Relations 
Theory” focuses on the development of the state-nation, where Wallerstein (1995) adresses 
that the best unit of analysis for social developments is the world system as a whole.  
Another approach which derives from the first two is the ‘Global City Thesis’, capturing other 
aspects of globalization that are hard to examine within the limits of the nation-state concept. 
Friedman (1986) recalls that the “World City Thesis” is relevant with the new international 
spatial division of labour that is an outcome of the ‘trans-nationalization of the firm’ as the 
basic production unit. Sassen (2001) provides “The Global City Thesis”, depending on 
research on the new international spatial division of labour between cities of the world, as part 
of the neo-liberal economic system of the post-1980 period. She takes the neo-liberal 
globalization process as the key influence in the transformation of world cities into global 
cities, and we may conclude that doing so Sassen follows an approach parallel to Wallerstein 
where the whole global system is taken as the main unit of analysis on the background. 
Sassen (2001) also provides the intra-city division of labour, which is relevant to the network 
society of Castells’ (1996).  
According to Sassen (2001) these global cities have become  
•  A home for agglomerations where most of the administrative functions are 
concentrated in 
•  Principle bases for financial and other advanced services which replaced the leader 
sector of the previous period, the manufacturing industries, 
•  Centres of innovation in these new dominant economic sectors, 
•  Major markets where the innovative products of both financial and other services and 
manufacturing industries. 
Sassen, (2001) provides us seven hypothesis of a Global City theory :  
First, while economic sectors that mark globalisation are decentralised geographically, they 
are strongly integrated through telecommunication and high technology transportation 
systems. Second, central functions of headquarters such as management, coordination, 
servicing, financing, marketing and technology development become so complicated that 
many of these functions are outsourced by these sectors. These firms buy their services from 
highly specialised firms. Third, these specialised service firms are subject to agglomeration 
economies and they settle in the metropolitan centres to provide their complex and 
information intensive services. Global cities are the production sites for these kind of high 
value services. Fourth, as the headquarters of leading economic sectors outsource their 
activities, they increase their mobility throughout the world and expand their activities to 
other locations elsewhere in the world. Fifth, specialised service firms follow their customers 
to provide cross-border and city to city transactions through their specialised networks. Where 
these services settle, the city becomes more and more interconnected to these webs. Sixth, a 
growing number of information and related workers concentrate in these cities to form the 
new middle class, which has a higher income level than the traditional middle class composed 
of industrial workers. That is why intra-city income disparities also do increase in time.   
Seventh, some sectors become subject to informalization as they can not compete with the 
high rank services or headquarters within the urban space but still their net effective demand 
is located within the city. Informalizing some or all of production and even service activities 
let them survive under these circumstances.    7
We may assume that Sassen’s hypothesis provide a framework for the transition of national 
economies and world cities within the Black Sea Region, to constitute a global integration 
zone. But we need some modifications as Sassen’s global city analysis usually refers to cities 
that have a global hinterland, and are cities of already established large economic systems. 
For our case it is a region in transition, the geography is still fragmented and the hinterland of 
the cities in this region are changing.  
Herrschel and Newman, (2002) emphasises this issue by reminding that identifying cities 
only with their roles in the command of the global economy may overplay their functional 
roles at the expense of their historical and cultural roles that shape them. Thus we have to 
extend the global city concept to the global city-region, to identify the unit of analysis by both 
global functions, and to employ cultural and historical roles, as well as local institutional 
structure that shape the city-region by both national and extra-national influences.  
We may thus apply this global city-region concept to our case, where these global city-regions 
develop networks among each other to establish a global integration zone.  
Future of Europe and the Black Sea Region 
Black Sea Region is at the moment rather a frontier for the European Union. Whether it will 
be an integrated part of Europe like the Baltic Sea Region or the Danube Basin is still a 
question (Drevet, 2002). Thus the emergence of a global integration zone in the Black Sea 
Region is an important issue related to the future structure of the European Union.  
Some opinions and scenarios in the future spatial development of Europe provides a valuable 
insight to our proposition of the emergence of a new global integration zone within the Black 
Sea Region. European spatial development and integration has been a concern since 1960’es, 
(e.g. Doxiadis, 1969), but the approaches to spatial development has diversified in the 
1990’es and 2000’s due to the expansion of European structures to east and increasing need 
for tighter relations within the Euro-Asian region.  
Figure.1 Doxiadis’ Europe at 2060 
 
Source: (Doxiadis, 1969, An Introduction to the  
Science of Human Settlements, Ekistics, Vol. 29, n.175, S.383), Adopted from Göçer (1977). 
In some recent scenarios, the agglomeration of economic sectors of the new economy within a 
strong core in the north-western Europe is the main focus. Before, this region was named as 
the Blue Banana,that extended through Milan. But the growth of Berlin and the strong   8
structure of the core including cities like London, Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Hannover 
caused a change in the views, which is today refered as a “Pentagon” (Wannop, 1995, 
French Presidency 2000).  These approaches share the opinion that development would 
radiate through Europe through transportation corridors. Another example for such an 
approach is that “Red Octopus Scenario” of van der Meer (1999). 
There is an opposition to such approaches as there are huge imbalances in terms of regional 
development within Europe. A counter opinion offers a network development, which has a 
poly-centric structure and drives its force from local co-operation and integration within sub-
continental trans-national regions. The common logic is that it is possible to make a better use 
of local resources, knowledge and potential, and mobilize resources, and regions may “learn” 
to compete by doing.  Diversity of economic activity across these regions is a key component 
as it provides a shelter for common economic shocks and puts less pressure on environment 
(Mehlbye, 2000) .  
Figure.2 Two Approaches  
Possible New Global Integration Zones  
 
New Zones of Metropolitan Co-operation in Europe 
   
Source: French Presidency (2000)
1 ve Guigou (2002)
2  
within Waterhout (2002) 
Source: Mehlbye (2000) within Waterhout (2002)  
We see that two approaches differ significantly from each other, when it comes to discussing 
role of Istanbul within the future of Europe, and its own surrounding territory in the Black Sea 
Region. The mono-centric approach promotes the development of a channel (an urban 
corridor) through Istanbul. From the perspective of Istanbul, this view does not represent the 
actual development within the region, as it does not consider historical socio-economic ties 
within the region, and does not take current local co-operations into account. The polycentric 
approach is both more suitable to reflect the present conditions in local co-operation, and is 
more desirable for decreasing regional disparities within the European space (Waterhout, 
2002).  
                                                 
1 French Presidency, 2000, Contribution to the Debate on the Long Term ESDP Polycentric Vision of Europe. Elaboration of a Long-Term 
Polycentric Vision of the European Space. Final Report, Vol.2. Paris: DATAR , Fransa 
 
2 Guigou, J-L, ed.2002., Aménager la France de 2020: Nouvelle Edition Revue et Augmentée. Paris: DATAR, Fransa   9
Mehlbye’s (2000) new possible global integration zones approach provides us a look at the 
polycentric development which draws a realistic framework for Istanbul. Istanbul is 
considered as a possible gateway to global economies and functions together with important 
centres like Athens, Thessaloniki, Sofia, Bucharest, Izmir and Bursa in this scenario. Odessa 
is shown as a national centre, which does not belong to any new global connections. 
Emergence of a New Global Integration Zone in the Black Sea Region? 
With this perspective, we propose that a new global integration zone might be emerging in the 
Black Sea Region as part of European system, due to influences of globalization and 
regionalization, and particularly due to Euro-Atlantic policies.  
An analysis on the formation of a new global integration zone should first of all take into 
account similar economic-spatial developments that are typical, like concentration of producer 
services and FDI. Second, due to complexity of this huge system of city-regions and 
difficulties in collection of data in the Black Sea Region, we have to narrow down our case to 
a particular relationship between two important city-regions with good access to international 
markets, like the port city Istanbul from Turkey and the port city Odessa from Ukraine. Third, 
we have to focus rather on the quality of the integration between these city-regions, like the 
variety of relationships and if they are mutual relationships rather than only single-sided 
transactions. This implies us to examine different issues that are proposed by Cappellin 
(1993) as essential to regional integration, that it requires a common historical background, 
mutual trust, mutual targets, common institutional backgrounds, multiple forward and 
backward linkages that create internal flows above the average. 
 
Therefore we make three assumptions: 
•  First, there must be similar political backgrounds for the emergence of such a global 
integration zone. Under influences of globalization, regionalization and Euro-Atlantic 
structures, we assume that similar political re-structuring processes are developing 
within the Black Sea Region. This implies establishment of trans-national co-
operations at the local government level, additionally to those at the national level. 
Hence we expect that co-operations at multiple levels should be established. 
•  Second, we assume that similar spatial socio-economic developments are occurring in 
the city-regions within the Black Sea Region. Here we try to find evidence of over-
concentration of economic activities, especially producer services and foreign direct 
investments in these city-regions, with respect to their national economic system. We 
use results of other research studies in evaluating the process of this transformation, 
but we try to follow the approach by Sassen (2001,2000,1994). We also try to evaluate  
the position of city-regions of the Black Sea Region in the global system of cities, 
following research held by those like Taylor and others, (2002 a, 2002b), and 
Derruder and others (2003a, 2003b), which basically provide parallel patterns with 
the approach of Sassen (2001). 
•  Third, we assume that there is increasing trans-national integration between the city-
regions within the Black Sea Region through mutual investments and multiple 
channels established at the inter-urban and regional level in the Black Sea Region. We 
try to use descriptive statistics and evaluate policy statements by top level officials or 
investors in the region, to analyze the pace of trans-national integration.  
Due to complexity of the research, we narrow down our study into the specific case of the 
provinces of Istanbul and Odessa. One reason for focusing on the province rather than the   10
core cities is the city-region structure of these provinces, where decentralisation of central 
governance creates a local governance system which may be best captured at the province 
level. In the next section we try to find evidence to support our assumptions and our thesis 
that a new global integration zone is emerging within the Black Sea Region. 
3. The Case of Istanbul and Odessa  
The fluency of Turkey’s membership to EU and the future of Ukraine makes it particularly an 
interesting case to study the relationships and the relative position of two sister cities within 
the global urban system. Istanbul and Odessa can be considered as the most important 
transportation nodes in the Black Sea Region.  
Now we discuss about our assumptions. Our first assumption is is that there are similar 
political developments that form the basis of a succesful regional integration. The quality of 
this regional integration requires to be coherent with current influences of neo-liberal 
globalization and regionalization, regarding our proposition on the emergence of a global 
integration zone. 
 
 3.1. Political Background  
A political background that would enable a succesful trans-national regional system requires 
policy convergence at three levels between two countries:  
 
a)  Convergence in international politics 
Emergence of a global integration zone, first of all, requires the existence of a common long 
term interest at the national level. A common political agenda opens up channels for further 
integration and either relaxes or eliminates borders. Production, distribution and consumption 
systems become integrated with the elimination of borders. In the context of neo-liberal 
globalization, this implies further integration to the global systems at the longer run. We may 
assume that a common economic policy (for mutual benefits) and a common security 
approach (for mutual trust) provide the basis of convergence in international politics which 
lead to the emergence of a global integration zone between subject countries.  
Turkey and Ukraine’s relationships have been evolving since the very beginning of the 
political change in Ukraine at 1991. Turkey was among the first countries to recognize 
Ukraine’s independence, and relationships flourished quickly parallel to policies of supra-
national structures like the United Nations, the EU, NATO and World Trade Organization. 
Ukraine and Turkey both aimed at membership to the European Union.  
Today there are over 70 agreements between Ukraine and Turkey, but the basic agreement is 
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Turkey and Ukraine signed at 4
th May, 
1992 (Ukrainian Embassy, at Ankara, 2003).  
The establishment of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation at 25
th June 1992 has further 
enhanced the relationships between two countries. The Black Sea Economic Co-operation 
Organization is based on the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) documents and the principles of the Paris Charter 
for a New Europe. The goals and principles in the Summit Declaration of the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation are in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
The BSEC Organization also co-operates with the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE).    11
Considering the will to support each others integration to Euro-Atlantic structures, the below 
table helps us to draw a picture about the current situation.  
Table.1 Turkey and Ukraine – Common Grounds 
 
Turkey  Ukraine 
Association Agreement with the EEC  12 September 1963  - 
Additional Protocol to Association Agreement with the EEC  27 Nov.1970  - 
Customs Union  6th March 1995  -  
Membership to CE  9 August 1949 
 
9.11.1995 / 16th September 2002 as a special 
guest of Parliamentary Assembly of the EC 
Application for Accession to EU  14th April 1987   
Partnership with EU  -  14
th June, 1994.   
Membership to BSEC   1993  1993 
Membership to OECD  14th of Dec. 1960  (Not a member but has contact) 
Membership to NATO  1952  Ongoing membership dialogues 
Membership to UN  24 Oct. 1945  24 Oct. 1945 
Membership to WTO  26th March 1995  applicant 
 
As given in the table above, Ukraine is not a member of the OECD. But Ukraine participates 
in the Network of Co-operation between Investment Promotion Agencies established by the 
OECD Istanbul Centre in 1996. The network allows Ukrainian officials to regularly consult 
their peers on policy promotional techniques and other matters and aims to improve 
experience of Ukraine in investment promotion (Peitsch, 1997).  
Though Turkey implements the rules of Customs Union, Ukraine currently enjoys most 
favoured-nation status with the European Union for export operations, and is not required to 
bind its own tariffs. Thus there are both similarities and differences, or in other words, either 
convergence and divergence in the international policies of Turkey and Ukraine where the 
former prevails because Ukraine’s relationship with the EU, NATO and WTO is usually 
blurred with its other relationships in the region (Woronowycz, 2004). This fluency in the 
international policy of Ukraine is not surprising concerning public opinions of Ukrainians.  
We see that in the Western and South-Western Regions (where Odessa is), there is more 
inclination to membership of Western institutes or national independency while on the east 
and southeast there is more inclination to strengthening of other bodies like a union between 
Russia-Belarussia and Ukraine (Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of 
Ukraine 2000). Molchanov (2004) and Woronowycz (2004) argues that more tangible steps 
have to be taken by Ukraine to demonstrate its will to join to the EU, which are especially 
associated with the Copenhagen Criteria, a concern of Turkey as well.  
For our interest, perhaps the most important indicator of future convergence in international 
politics is the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan by  21
st  Feb. 2005,  with priorities of 
cross-border and trans-national co-operation and development of the free market economy. 
For the coming decade, Turkey’s 9
th National Plan of 2007-2013 and Ukraine’s Economic 
and Social Development Strategy for 2002-2011 together with the EU-Ukraine Action plan 
will be key elements in the development of trans-national co-operation which would 
strengthen the convergence of international policy of both countries.   12
Spatial Integration 
Spatial integration is a key element for the realization of re-integration in the Euro-Asian 
space. The development of transportation, energy and communication corridors provides the 
basis of development within this space, where Euro-Atlantic structures and especially 
European Union is dependent to energy resources in Middle Asia. Spatial integration and 
development does not only enable the flow of goods, information and energy, but it is thought 
to support the economic development of the less developed Middle Asian and some Black Sea 
countries, to increase stability in the longer run. Thus our proposition of an emerging global 
integration zone depends very much on the physical infrastructure and spatial integration. 
The initial project of transportation important for the region was the North-South Trans-
European Motorway Network (TEM), which started at 1977 under coordination of  United 
Nations Economic Comission for Europe (UNECE). Though Ukraine did not take place in 
TEM at that time, Turkey’s accession to the region is highly improved through road corridors 
in Bulgaria and Romania.   
During the 1980’es, development of Trans-European Networks (TENs) became a priority of 
European integration. Unlike TEM, these networks included all kinds of transportation and 
telecommunication networks.  In the 1990’es these networks expanded to enable  the Euro-
Asian integration based on a market economy. The first expansion was the Black Sea Pan 
European Transport Area (PETrA), which later evolved into Transport Corridor Europe- 
Caucasus and Asia (TRACECA), by 1998 to build the Silk Road of the 21
st century. Ukraine 
takes place in this project. 
Principle targets of TRACECA provide a strong ground on regional integration for Turkey 
and Ukraine in the long run as they propose provision of access to European and world 
markets, regional cooperation among member states of TRACECA, and optimal integration of 
TRACECA with TENs. TRACECA does not only deal with infrastructure but also with 
integrating legislative and operative systems. 
If we have a brief look on TRACECA and 
the position of Istanbul and Odessa, we see 
that both are major transportation nodes 
within the TRACECA area. The ports of 
Odessa and Illichevsk in the Odessa 
Province are the major ports together with 
Istanbul and Derince (Turkey), Burgaz and 
Varna (Bulgaria), Constanza (Romania) in 
the Western Black Sea Region.  
We may conclude that TRACECA 
provides access to both sides in the case of 
Istanbul and Odessa, where Istanbul finds 
the opportunity to access to Baltic – Black 
Sea markets through Odessa, and Odessa 
finds the opportunity to access the large 
Turkish and Mediterranean markets.   
Figure.3 Transport Routes in Western Black Sea 
Region 
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b)  Convergence in local governance and decentralization  
The nature of the relationship we assume relies on the establishment of  trans-national 
cooperation among local governments in the Black Sea Region. For our case, we face 
different levels of decentralisation of governance in Turkey and Ukraine, but there is a 
convergence in the pattern of decentralisation. The decentralisation processes of the European 
Council and the United Nations are imposed in both countries. Decentralisation process in 
Turkey follows a different pattern due to its membership to Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), but we may conclude that Ukraine’s ongoing 
partnership with the OECD and the pressure of EU and NATO on the democratization of the 
governance system might in the longer run lead to a convergence between Turkey and 
Ukraine in this field.  
Regarding Istanbul, The OECD (2001) report ‘Cities for Citizens: Improving Governance for 
Metropolitan Areas’ and its principles endorsed by the OECD Territorial Development Policy 
Committee in June 2000 (OECD 2000) are of utmost importance for the transformation of 
governance in Istanbul Metropolitan Area through decentralization of authority. Indeed, 
recent legislative changes have expanded the authorities of metropolitan municipality and 
introduced strategic management approach. 
The most solid political ground about local governance and decentralization of central 
authority, shared by Turkey and Ukraine, is the one based on European Council and European 
Union policies.  Turkey in the South-Eastern Europe and Ukraine in the Central and Eastern 
Europe  have both taken parts in the ‘European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-
operation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities Concerning Interregional Co-
operation’ as may be seen in table below.  
Table.2 Council Of Europe European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation Between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities Concerning Interterritorial Co-operation 
  Turkey – Southeastern Europe  Ukraine – Central and Eastern Europe 










Date of Entry 
into Action 
European Charter of 
Local Self Government 
(15.10.1985) 
9th Dec. 1992    1
st Apr. 1993 
 
N/A -  - 
Madrid Convention* 
of European Council   
(21st  May 1980) 
1998   2000  N/A -  - 
Additional Protocol* 
(9th Nov.1995) 
Not  signed  -  - N/A -  - 
Protocol No.2. *   
(5th May 1998) 
Not signed  -  -  3th of Nov. 
1998 
4
th of Nov. 
2004 
5
th of Feb. 
2005 
* the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities 
Concerning Interterritorial Co-operation 
Both countries are willing to establish trans-national co-operations at the local level and 
decentralisation of authority, and thus have become members of  Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of Europe.The table below demonstrates parallel developments in 
legislative bases that build a base for trans-national cooperation at the local level:   14
Table.3 Turkey and Ukraine – Acts on Trans-national Cooperation of Local Governments and 
Decentralisation 
 
  Turkey Ukraine 
 
Date Act Date  Act 
The Principles  1982  Principle Act of Turkey     
2002  Act. No. 4749 (Act on Public 
Finance and Debt Management) 
 
10 Jul. 2003  “About the Approval of the 
State Development Program 
of Small Towns” 
2004  Act no.5272 (The Municipal Act)  2003  documents submitted to the 
Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine in 2003 
Jun.2004  Act no. 5216 (The Greater City 
Municipal Act) 
18 Nov. 2003.  Law “About the 
Transfrontier Cooperation” 
Trans-national 
cooperation at the local 
level 
2004, 2005  Act.No. 5197/2004 that is changed 
by Act.5302/2005 (Provincial 
Special Administration Act 
  
2004, 2005  Act.No. 5197/2004 that is changed 
by Act.5302/2005 (Provincial 
Special Administration Act 
2003  documents submitted to the 
Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine in 2003 









On the side of Ukraine, we see that , following NATO Summit, EU has refused to start an 
action plan in the mid-2004. Ukraine has ratified the additional protocol of the Outline 
Convention at November 2004, and has only recently put into action by 5
th February 2005. 
We see that the EU Action Plan has started by 21
st of February, just two weeks later.  
Ukraine  - EU Action plan is a complementary plan to Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement between EU and Ukraine and is to last for 3 years onward from 2004. The action 
plan includes important elements for cross-border co-operation, strategic planning at the 
national and regional level until 2015, privatization, financial deregulations, foreign direct 
investments, commitment to Pan-European Transport Corridors and continuing involvement 
to TRACECA project, trade of services and many other issues from defense to research.  
The implementation of this action plan is a basic indicator of convergence of policy at the 
local level as well as the national level between Turkey and Ukraine. It means that EU 
Cohesion Policy as provided in the Community Strategic Guidelines for 2007-2013 (CEC, 
2005) will be an important policy in determining the orientation of local governance and 
spatial development approaches, where a polycentric urban-regional development, 
diversification of economic and social structure through trans-national cooperation and 
thematic and geographic concentration of  economic activities are emphasised, which would 
eventually support the emergence of a global integration zone within the subject territory.   
Nevertheless there are still arguments about the regional administrative capacity in both 
countries  (Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005 and Romaniuk, 2002). EU Commission identifies 
regional administrative capacity as a core requirement together with efficiency in regional and 
local public administration for efficient implementation of acquis and the dispersion of 
structural funds (Hughes et al, 2000). As an example, progress reports on Turkey since 2000 
requires Turkey to strengthen its institutional capacity for regional development at the central 
level by State Planning Organization, and at the regional level by establishing Regional 
Development Agencies (CEC, 2004)   15
c)  Establishing institutional backgrounds at the local levels 
Another indicator that shows political convergence is a real agreement between local 
governments.  
After the Black Sea Co-operation was initiated by Turkey and enacted by 1992, many twin 
city agreements were signed among Black Sea countries.  
By 1997, 10 twinning agreements were signed between Turkey and Ukraine, including that 
between The Municipality of Greater Istanbul and The Municipality of Odessa. The articles of 
the agreement is as follows: 
 
Box.1  Articles of Twin City Agreement Between Istanbul and Odessa , Nov. 1997 (Municipal agreement)* 
1.  Both sides will promote co-operation in culture, information, science and technology, arts, environment, health, 
sports and tourism in the framework of traditional and historical ties. 
2.  Both sides will develop co-operation among institutions to make use of the experiences in these co-operation 
areas and they will try to exchange experience in these areas. 
3.  Both sides will exchange personnel and specialists to develop the work in these areas and realize exchange of 
knowledge and experience. They will enable reciprocal internships and technical education  
4.  Both sides will try to join scientific conferences, seminars and meetings to develop relations held in the sister 
city. 
5.  Both sides will technically support each other, and will inform the other about developments and tenders in this 
framework. 
6.  both sides will try to name places in their cities to represent the other’s cultural and historical values. 
7.  Both sides will help to represent the other’s culture in events like fairs, festivals etc. 
8.  both sides will support visits of students and teachers of the other to improve relations 
9.  Both sides will support each other in international grounds and will try to co-operate in international events. 
*Translated by the authors of this study 
 
The protocol was signed by Eduard GURVITZ, the municipal mayor of Odessa and Recep 
Tayyip ERDOĞAN, then municipal mayor of Istanbul, who became the prime minister of 
Turkey after 2003 elections. 
We shall also add that the establishment of Black Sea Capital Cities Association at 1998, 
has a supplementary effect on the integration of other cities within the Black Sea Region as 
this Association involves both municipalities and central governments’ local administrations 
within its body. We see that later, at 26
th June 2002, a further step for integration between 
Istanbul and Odessa came. The Governorship of the Province of Istanbul
3 and The 
Governorship of the Odessa Oblast signed a co-operation agreement in trade, science, 
technology and social issues that covered the whole city regions, and extended the 
opportunities of cooperation to other fields that were not covered within the framework of 
municipal agreements.  
We have to mention here a few words from an interview by the Ambassador of Ukraine to 
Turkey, Dr. Ihor Dolhov, published in the Turkish Daily News in January, 2003: 
 
“…..Let me point out here an important aspect that, in my view, could positively effect further relations 
between Ukraine and Turkey. Our both states entered the year of 2003 with newly formed governments. They 
are supported by parliamentary majorities, respectively, in Ukraine and Turkey, that is, for sure, an 
important prerequisite for the efficient accomplishment of governmental tasks regarding domestic and 
                                                 
3 Central Government’s local administration unit   16
foreign policy. Since both governments determined the regional cooperation as a priority pillar of their 
external activities, I think that such a mutual approach should be used for boosting intergovernmental 
cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey……… The Government of Ukraine determined to further enhance 
the regional cooperation towards the aim of establishing the twins’ relations between provinces and cities of 
Ukraine and Turkey.” (Turkish Daily News, 2003)  
According to Dolhov, Local governments, universities, local chambers of industry and 
commerce co-operated in the framework of regional co-operation. There are student 
exchanges, children’s group visits and other activities as well. Following Dolhov’s interview, 
a workgroup was established at 29
th April, 2003, by an additional protocol. The workgroup 
visited Odessa between 28-31 July, 2003, together with the vice-mayor of Governorship of 
Istanbul, members of executive assembly of Istanbul, two district municipalities of Istanbul, 
Marine Trade Chamber of Istanbul, Chamber of Trade of Istanbul, Turkish Assembly of 
Exporters, Foundation for Commercial Co-operation of Turkey, Turkish Airlines, 
Commission of Foreign Economic Relations Turkish-Ukrainian Business Council, some 
businessmen.  Two more protocols were signed during this visit, one about city twinning this 
time at the district level, between Municipality of Eminönü district of Istanbul and 
Municipality of the district of Belgorod – Dnestrovskiy (Akkerman) of Odessa.  
We must also stress that the cooperation agreements do function in actual life. Ferry lines 
between Odessa and Istanbul were established after the twin city agreement in 1997 (Turkish 
Daily News, 2003). In the 1999 Earthquake around Istanbul, Ukraine’s emergency aid teams 
could be seen all around the region. Istanbul municipality was there after the flood in Odessa 
at year 2000 (Radikal, 2003).   
These twin city agreements and state policies on developing twin city agreements confirm our 
assumption of convergence of policies at the local government level, a key element in 
establishing a global integration zone. The ever-increasing number of other twin cities also 
confirms that there is a strong will in building global relationships on neo-liberal grounds. Up 
to date, number of twin cities of Istanbul has risen to 49, while those of Odessa to 17, from all 
over the world.   
 
3.2. Emergence of Istanbul and Odessa as National-Regional Centres of International Trade, and their 
place in the global context  
Our second assumption was that neo-liberal globalization and regionalization processes lead 
to similar spatial socio-economic changes within the Black Sea Region which brings some 
cities to the fore gaining power in the global organization of production. Therefore, we expect 
to find similarities between Istanbul and Odessa as they become more and more exposed to 
effects of globalization and regionalization.  
One of the key spatial socio-economic changes is the shift of administrative power from the 
state institutions to private multinational companies, and its repercussions on the world cities 
of a nation-state. This usually follows agglomeration of producer and distributive services in 
certain cities, and an agglomeration of FDI (Hall,1999, Sassen, 1991). Thus we will try to 
analyse if both Istanbul and Odessa attract foreign capital, increase their population and turn 
into cities where private companies in producer and distributer services agglomerate. Our 
limitations imply us to evaluate only other studies, rather than conduct a comparative analysis 
of our own, for this time. 
One particular issue we have to mention is that the transition to neo-liberal system is not a 
painless process. People of the Black Sea Region has suffered rising illegal and informal 
activities, as poverty arouse due to sharp drops in productivity levels in these countries. If we 
return to Sassen’s  (2001), Global City Thesis, the seventh hypothesis, the rise of informal   17
activities emerge as an expected outcome of neo-liberal globalization in cities subject to its 
effects. We have witnessed a large labor migration to Turkey, frankly, to Istanbul, from 
Ukraine and other Black Sea countries in the post 1990 period. This was a much different 
migration than the forced migration or what we can call “slave trade” in the 16th century 
Black Sea. The collapse of productivity within the Black Sea Region countries and increasing 
poverty forced many people to rush to Istanbul seeking work. According to a conservative 
estimation, illegal immigrants in Istanbul, the Marmara Region and the Black Sea provinces 
of Turkey reached to 250.000 people (Duymaz 1995 and Erder, 2000 within Geniş, 2004) 
4.  Some other estimates in the newspapers vary between 150.000-1.000.000 immigrants 
(Kirişçi, 2003).  
These sectors these immigrants were employed included informal manufacturing production, 
construction, retail, household services and illegal activities. Informal manufacturing 
activities and retail went hand in hand in the European side of Istanbul Metropolitan area, 
where most of these activities were concentrated within a few locations like Laleli and 
Aksaray at the historical peninsula, Karaköy next to historical peninsula. Large illegal 
housing stock and slum areas enabled accomodation. Apart from immigrants, many people 
from the Balkans and the Black Sea Region came to Istanbul for luggage trade.  
Both our own observations and Geniş’s (2004) field interviews tell us that the luggage trade 
between Turkey and these transition economies played a key role in the initial integration. 
According to an interview of Geniş (2004) luggage trade reached to approximately 5 to 10 
billion USD annualy in Istanbul. Especially in Laleli district at 2001, 95% of all sales of 4500 
shops were made to visitors from former Soviet Union countries, Bulgaria, Romania and 
some Central European countries. According to a study report prepared by Erkut for Genar 
(2002), depending on field survey executed in the historical peninsula,  even after the 
economic crisis of 1998 in Asia and Russia, still about half of all customers of the 
manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers were from Black Sea Countries. These 
manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers preferred to employ citizens of Black Sea countries 
as they could use their native languages which was very important in establishing trust 
between diverse cultures. Citizens of Black Sea countries also seemed to accept to work in an 
informal way, without permission, insurance or other rights, and without adequate living 
conditions.  
İstanbul and Odessa are key locations for the informal migration, which could be regarded as 
a side effect of this transition period. As an example, during the first half of 2002, 688 women 
(mostly Moldovians) were deported from Turkey and sent to Odessa, the main junction for 
human trafficking (USAID, 2002). Therefore, we hope that the successful development of a 
global integration zone through increasing integration between these two cities will provide 
better opportunities  to people of the region. Now let’s return to our evaluation on the spatial 
development of İstanbul and Odessa as national centres in the post 1980 period.  
 
a)  Istanbul’s Transformation into a Global City  
Keyder and Öncü (1993) is one of the earlier studies that mention about transformation of 
İstanbul from a world city into a global city under neo-liberal policies of the post 1980 period 
                                                 
4 Duymaz, İ., 1995, Türkiye’de Yabancı Kaçak İşçilik (İllegal Foreign Work in Turkey), Istanbul, Friedrich EbertVakfı 
 
Eder, M., 2001, The Challenge of Globalization and Turkey’s Changing Political Economy in Turkey in World Politics: 
an Emerging Multi-regional Power, edited by R.Barry and K.Kirişçi, Boulder &London: Lynne Rienner 
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that is characteristically influenced by de-nationalization, decentralization and financial 
deregulations in Turkey. The change in the spatial organization in this period supporting this 
view may be found in some studies like those of Erkut and Baypinar, (2003), Baypinar, 
(2003) and Gezici and Hewings (2003).  The major findings provide us a picture where we 
see a continuing concentration of population and economic activity within major metropolitan 
areas like İstanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Antalya and Ankara. Erkut and Baypinar (2003) and 
Baypinar (2003) provide also evidence of the formation of an urban region around Istanbul 
metropolitan city.  Key findings show that the region’s share of population in the country 
continues to increase, foreign direct investments and producer and distributer services are 
most concentrated in this region, supporting the emergence of Istanbul and its surrounding as 
a new global city-region. 
The size of the population in Istanbul has grown significantly in the post 1980 period, which 
increase its weight not only in the Black Sea Region, but in the Balkans, Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Istanbul’s population rose to 10,187,328 people at 2000, 
from 4,741,890 at year 1980 while Turkey’s population increased to 67,803,927 from 
44,736,957 at the same period. Thus İstanbul has gained political power within Turkey as 
well, due to increasing share of population within the country.  
Figure.4 Change in the population share of provinces in the country 
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Source : Erkut and Baypinar, 2003 
This transformation is partially due to the export-oriented industrialisation of Istanbul and its 
surrounding neighbours and the re-location of financial centres from Ankara to Istanbul due to 
financial deregulations. Increasing integration to neo-liberal global system also have attracted 
foreign direct investments (FDI) to the city and its vicinity.  International specialisation of 
Turkey in textiles and machinery manufacturing industries, The spill over of industrial 
workplaces in the neighbouring provinces,  and the extreme concentration of producer 
(especially financial) services within the core of Istanbul are the key logics of this 
transformation process (Geniş, 2004, Erkut and Baypinar, 2003, Baypinar, 2003, Keyder 
and Öncü, 1993).   19
Table.4 Growth and Diversification of Manufacturing Activities in Metropolitan Regions of Turkey During 1980-1998 Period 







Regional Specialisation Level at 1980*  0.376  0.604  0.557  1.022 (mean) 
Regional Specialisation Level at 1998*  0.346  0.623  0.354  0.962 (mean) 
Number of manufacturing workplaces at 
1980* 
3,919 560  395  8,707 
Number of manufacturing workplaces at 
1998* 
4,007 1,004 856  12,332 
Total change in the number of 
manufacturing workplaces between 1980-
1998** 
88** 444**  461**  3,625** 
Number of employees at 1980 in 
manufacturing industries** 
242,115 41,179  32593  786,995 
Number of employees at 1998 in 
manufacturing industries** 
338,051 67,710  112965  1,206,164 
GDP Per Capita Change 1990-1997  %17.05  %12.89  %7.53  21.06% 
Cumulative Net increase in the number of 
firms in finance, insurance and real estate 
services1990-1995 
8,290 3,391 547  19,622 
Cumulative Net increase in the number of 
firms in transportation and storage sector 
3,763 877  233  9,978 
Source: Baypinar, 2003b, Using State Institute of Statistics of Turkey’s Data 
*Regional specialisation levels are calculated by Baypinar, 2003a, using a dissimilarity index where regional specialisation levels vary 
between 0 and 2, the higher indicating less diversification. See Traistaru et al (2002) for methodology  
**Manufacturing workplaces include those with 10 or more employees. Statistics are derived from annual averages. 
***Yalova and Kırıkkale were districts of Istanbul and Ankara, but have become provinces later. 
Table 5 below demonstrates us Istanbul’s emergence as the basic global gateway city in 
Turkey, attracting almost all foreign direct investments in most of the producer services, most 
of the investments in distributive services and about half of the investments in transformative 
industries, similar to discussions of Sassen (2001), and Hall (1999).  
 
Table.5 Cumulative Number of Multinational Firms in Istanbul and Turkey, between 1980 and 2002 
             
   Turkey  Istanbul   
Sector   Number 
of Firms 
% Number  of 
Firms 
% Istanbul/Turkey 
Extractive industries    232  3.8  58  1.6  25.0 
Transformative industries    1,825  30.0  914  25.7  50.0 
Distributive Services    2,823  46.4  1909  53.7  68.0 
Producer Services    485  8.0  398  11.2  82.0 
Social Services    78  1.3  54  1.5  69.0 
Personal Services    640  10.5  224  6.3  35.0 
Total   6,083  100.0  3,557  100.0  - 
Source: Geniş, 2004, data by  Undersecretary of Treasury of Turkey   20
b)  Development of Odessa in the Post Soviet Era 
The historical importance of Odessa rose from the grain trade that ran from Odessa to 
Thessaloniki and to Ukrainian Markets. The trade volume of Odessa has surpassed that of St. 
Petersburg by 19
th century, through trade of grains. The region has become a strong 
international industrial centre by the end of the 19
th century, with over 500 industrial plants 
and 16.000 workers (RBAC,2004).  In the Soviet period, it has become a key location as a 
port for the naval forces, as well as a gateway to the rest of the world. 
The collapse of the Soviet economic system has had far reaching implications under 
influences of globalization in Ukraine and Odessa. By 1999, the GDP of Ukraine was only 
35% of that in 1989, which gave rise to widespread poverty and related problems (Ishaq and 
Hare, 1997). One of the dramatic reflections was the rise of the city as a transfer node for 
trafficking of women, not very much mentioned beneath the rise of the city as a transfer node 
of natural gas and petroleum products. Another immediate effect was the problems related to 
the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, one of the largest fleets in the world, which contributed to the 
economy of this port city.   
Odessa province slightly lost population, parallel to the general trend in the country, due to 
complex reasons. Ukriane’s population dropped from 51.9 million at 1990, to 51.6 million at 
1991 and to 47.6 million at 2003, reflecting a dramatic increase in mortality rates, sharp 
decline in birth rates and out migration (CEC, 2004). The population of Odessa Province was 
2.653.300 by the beginning of 1991, but it dropped to 2.423.275 by 2004. The city’s 
population was 1.106.000 by 1990, and it has lost some population until today as well. By 
2004, the city’s population was 1.012.900.  One of the sharpest falls in population was after 
1998 economic crisis, when region’s population dropped about 19.200 people in one year 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, Ukraine (1999). 
One of the worst effects of economic decline on the city should have been the increase in 
poverty which lead to the increasing informal activity that gave rise to AIDS and other 
problems. The Ministry of Health of Ukraine has estimated the number of epidemics about 
500.000 by 2002. According to the USAID data,  in Odessa, AIDS was three times more 
prevalent as in other southern and eastern provinces  like Dnipropetrovsk, Mikolayiv and 
Donestsk (USAID, 2004).   
Thus Odessa has been influenced significantly from the negative initial effects of transition to 
a market economy, though it had an advantageous location for international. The human 
development indicators show that the region still is at the bottom of the list in Ukraine. At 
1999 it was the 26
th and it was 27
th at 2000 and 2001 according to regional human 
development index by a UNDP’s Ukraine Human Development Report 2001 (Mrinska, 
2003). This means it was one of the two least developed regions together with Donetsk, an old 
industrial centre.  
This is surprising when we consider that Odessa is a region which attracts foreign direct 
investments quite successfully. Today Odessa is a home for more than 560 companies from 
63 countries, with about 289.3 Million USD of foreign direct investments (ABD and AUB, 
2005).     21
Table.6 Foreign Direct Investments in Some Ukrainian Regions 










Source: Ishaq, 1997, data by Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 
According to Ögütçü and Kinach, (2002), 40% of cumulative FDI was attracted by Kiev and 
its surrounding, while Odessa performed among those like Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk , Poltiva 
and Zaporizhya by the end of 2001. Mrinska, (2003) addresses Odessa among the first group 
of regions which enjoy the highest share of national and foreign investments, high level of 
education, skilled labour and developed services, among Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, and 
Dnipropetrovsk.  We may conclude that Odessa has transformed into an international centre 
of second importance within Ukraine, which is primarily a service city rather than an 
industrial core like Donetsk. The primary service city is still Kiev, due to high level of 
centrality inherited from the Soviet Union. 
For the next decade, we may expect a relative increase in the importance of Odessa if further 
decentralisation and financial regulations will be experienced in Ukraine, as we have observed 
such influence in Istanbul.  
 
c)  Istanbul and Odessa in the Global System of Cities 
At this section we evaluate the relative position of Istanbul and Odessa in the neo-liberal 
global system depending on a group of studies which focus on the distribution of global 
producer services across global cities in which they establish their own networks. These 
producer services enable the functioning of complex flexible production systems while they 
build horizontal and vertical linkages among different actors. Thus command power in the 
global economy is concentrated highly in these cities.  
These cities both provide access to their hinterland for global investors, and reciprocally, 
provide access to world markets for those who choose to locate in them, as in the case for 
Sao-Paolo or Miami (Taylor and others, 2002a). Last but not the least, these cities 
themselves are huge markets that attract both local and foreign capital at first hand, because 
the possible benefits of locating in such a city surpasses any other city within the vicinity. Due 
to opennes to global shocks, especially those cities in developing or transition countries can 
be considered open to risks.   
We have to point to the fact that most of these studies base on global service providers as they 
are thought to be best indicators of control power in a global economy. As most of the data 
collected at the nation-state level isolate the cities from the real world and thus do not provide 
suitable information on the transactions between these individual agglomerations of global 
service providers, it is thought that data on global service providers may capture some 
features essential for the measurement of control power of a city at the global scale.  
According to Beaverstock and others, (1999), Istanbul and Kiev are among global legal 
service centres, but Istanbul is also a global banking and advertisement centre. Thus Istanbul 
emerges as a multifunctional producer services centre. Other centres emerging are Athens,   22
Bucharest, Moscow and St. Petersburg within the region of Black Sea   Economic Co-
operation.  
The study research by Taylor and others (2002a) identifies global cities as global service 
centres, and inter-global networks as a network that consists of inter-twinted relationships 
between global business and finance firms. Therefore the study neglects the influences of 
sectors like industry or retail, as these services are thought to represent the transactions that 
are part of these sectors as well.  
Taylor and others (2002a) imply that global cities are not only centres where power is 
concentrated, that they are as well strategic centres following Sassen (1994). Here they take 
unique positions within the political geography-offered by Sassen (2001) which is an 
outcome of increasingly inter-twinted strategic centres through neo-liberal globalization- as 
the principle basis. In this sense they conclude that it is not possible to simply rank cities 
according to their global power as these cities gain power from their unique position within 
the network they are connected to, and from reciprocal relationships
5. Apart from these 
limitations, such studies still provide some insight in understanding relative position of cities 
in the global city system. 
The data set covers 123 cities around the world and locations of 100 global service provider 
firms. Global connectivity, connectivity to financial centres, dominance, global command 
centres, regional command centres, gateway cities and gateways to emerging markets are 
discussed in this study. For our concern in this study, Istanbul is in this group of global cities, 
together with Kiev, Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Nicosia and Beirut, which implies all these 
cities have a significant level of connection to global markets.  
  
Figure.5 Global Cities as High Connectivity Gateways 
 
Source: Taylor and others, 2002a 
The major finding of the study by Taylor and others (2002a), to our concern, is that neither 
Istanbul nor cities in the surrounding trans-national region do possess high connectivity to 
                                                 
5 We have to emphasise that the importance of these relations is measured with a bias that imposes the strength 
of the relationships of global cities with global command centres like London, New York and Tokyo, thus may 
hide important elements regarding the emergence of a global integration zone within our study area.   23
global financial centres
6. Though there is a large agglomeration of financial services with an 
increasing share of foreign capital, it is surprising that the region is struck between newly 
developing financial regions in Europe and the striking growth of a region of  financial 
centres in the Pacific Asia.   
Istanbul is not a regional command centre according to this study, but is also rivalled by no 
other city in its  own trans-national territory. The city emerges as global gateway city with 
high connectivity to other global cities (Istanbul is represented as ‘IS’ in figure 5). 
Another concern for Istanbul is that there is a huge blank geography where countries in the 
Middle Asia and Caucasus, but these regions have historical connections with the city. 
Concerning the situation of Odessa, other historical city relations with Warsaw and Moscow 
must be taken into account, as these centres also possess high connectivity as gateways to 
global economies like Istanbul (figure above). 
Another study by Taylor and others (2002b) focuses more on the locations of headquarters 
and offices of 46 firms that provide global advanced producer services. These firms include 
media, finance and legal-administrative consultancy firms. Istanbul is categorized as a third 
rank (gamma) city, where London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, Chicago, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Los Angeles are alpha cities (first rank). Istanbul emerges as the only 
city as a global centre within its surrounding region. If we put Odessa in the centre, Moscow 
is in the second rank while Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw are third rank centres. In this 
perspective it is possible to say that Odessa is in the middle of these world cities, on the very 
border of a huge blank geography.  
Derruder and Witlox (2002) provides another rank system using the same data set but their 
methodology is based on a fuzzy logic statistical approach  where they have grouped Cairo 
and Istanbul as in the same rank of cities. In the North, Moscow and Warsaw are similary 
grouped. Ankara is grouped with regional cities like Tashkent, Baku, Alma Ata and Tahran 
which are also capitals in their respected countries.  In this approach, Odessa again becomes a 
border city in the global context, where in the north there is Warsaw and Moscow, and in the 
south Istanbul and Cairo.  
In two other studies, Derruder and others’ (2003a, 2003b) have expanded the data set used 
by Taylor and others  (2002a, 2002b) to 234 cities from the world, and used fuzzy cluster 
analysis. Istanbul has not emerged as a global centre this time, and neither did Odessa.  
Thus, as a result for this section, our conclusion for this section is that our proposal of the 
emergence of a new global integration zone only partially proves to be true, regarding low 
performance of development in Odessa relative to other regions in Ukraine and the wider 
trans-national territory surrounding the city-region. A further decentralization in the local 
government system), financial deregulations and Ukraine’s membership to World Trade 
Organization could accelerate the mechanisms of neo-liberal globalization and our 
proposition may strengthen (DEİK, 2004, Oğuz, 2003, Turkish Daily News, 2003, 
Romaniuk, 2002).  
On the other hand, Istanbul emerges as a global command centre with multiple functions that 
are part of the basic processes of neo-liberal globalization; within the Black Sea Region. 
Odessa seems to be located as a gateway that provides accession between the existing and 
emerging global centres like Warsaw, Kiev and Moscow, and Istanbul. This conclusion does 
                                                 
6 We should however reserve that in the last 4 years there has been further integration to global capital in the 
finance industry in Istanbul.   24
not deny our assumption of local integration, but alters it in a way that puts Odessa in the 
place of a border city ironically after name of Ukraine, ‘the border country’.  
 
3.3. Re-Integration in the Black Sea Region and Istanbul and Odessa  
We now try to focus on our third assumption that there is increasing trans-national economic 
integration between Istanbul and Odessa at multiple levels.  Our approach here is to use 
descriptive statistics and firm-level information in interregional trade and investments at the 
city-region level where data is available. The major limitation here is that it is not possible to 
measure if the relationship between two cities are higher than average level of relationships 
between these two cities and any other city in a different country. As the relationship between 
Istanbul and Odessa depend highly on national policies, a look at the general situation of the 
bilateral trade between Turkey and Ukraine will be helpful. 
a)  Trade in the Black Sea Region  
The bilateral trade relations of Turkey and Black Sea countries have based largely on the so-
called luggage trade during the first decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Due to 
missing established distribution channels and trade links, people filled in the gap and luggage 
trade prevailed. People of  newly independent states simply started to visit other countries and 
shop themselves to sell these goods in their own countries. In Istanbul, this kind of trade 
concentrated largely in a few locations like the historical peninsula and some other locations 
in the Western side close to either international ferry links and the international airport. The 
amount of trade in Istanbul through luggage trade rose up to 5-10 billion USD annually 
according to the estimates, which was almost equivalent to half of Turkey’s exports at that 
time (Geniş, 2004). However, after 1998, countries like Russia and Ukraine targeted on the 
gradually decrease of luggage trade to enable more institutionalised forms of trade.  
Luggage trade’s function was to transfer consumer products to the Black Sea countries where 
there was an immediate need to satisfy. For Turkey, Black Sea meant raw materials and 
energy.  Turkey’s need to diversify its energy inputs after the Gulf War lead to increasing 
imports from Russia and other countries. Ukraine’s importance increased as a transport route 
to Turkey. Turkey’s developing machinery industries also required large supplies of coal, iron 
and steel (see the tables below). Thus, a kind of inter-industry trade developed, where Turkey 
largely supplied consumer goods and imported raw materials.  
Table.7 Turkey’s Foreign Trade  Between 1996-2004 (in Thousand USD), 
   BSEC countries  New Independent States  Ukraine 












2004 6,778,626.45  15,368,135.51 3,961,619.42 12,926,893.93 575,826.91 2,509,351.39
2003 5,044,444.23 9,297,693.90 2,962,592.51 7,777,110.63 444,967.28 1,331,505.47
2002 3,598,969.50 6,587,757.35 2,278,877.68 5,554,504.15 313,265.00  991,097.28
2001 2,932,470.83 5,553,205.82 1,978,150.09 4,630,241.48 289,179.62  757,625.63
2000 2,466,866.61 6,746,470.89 1,648,736.69 5,693,035.59 258,121.19  981,559.78
1999 2,232,283.98 4,307,609.62 1,532,805.51 3,733,802.93 225,821.19  773,686.39
1998 3,290,239.50 4,357,566.78 2,666,523.36 3,724,360.24 274,317.06  988,781.32
1997 3,824,985.68 4,495,436.69 3,512,047.62 3,615,083.79 337,045.00  917,760.13
1996 2,926,481.84 3,896,559.67 2,663,908.73 3,074,152.97 267,538.50  761,658.43
Source: State Institute of Statistics, Turkey 
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b)  Turkey and Ukraine-Trade Relations 
Turkish-Ukrainian trade relations in the post-Soviet era started by the establishment of the 
Turkish-Ukrainian Business Council at April, 1991. Since then, bilateral trade between 
Turkey and Ukraine has developed very slowly. Turkey’s imports are concentrated more on 
raw materials or intermediate inputs like iron and steel, while Turkey’s exports varies, 
including food, machinery and metal products. It is possible to say that intra-industry trade 
has not developed much during the period. However, recent increase in trade volume between 
Ukraine and Turkey has raised hopes and is followed by the establishment of International 
Turkish and Ukrainian Businessmen Association at Kiev in 28th August 2004.  
Table.8 Foreign Trade of Turkey and Ukraine (‘000 USD) 




2004 575,827  2,466,984 
2003 444,967  1,331,505 
2002 313,265  991,097 
2001 289,180  988,781 
2000 258,121  981,560 
1999 225,821  917,760 
1998 274,317  856,340 
1997 337,045  773,686 
1996 267,539  761,658 
1995 198,534  757,626 
1994 76,285  535,071 
1993 39,449  472,706 
1992 35,848  90,003 
Source, State Institue of Statistics, Turkey 
Trade between Ukraine and Turkey in 2004 was still highly depended on Turkey’s large 
imports of iron, steel and mineral fuels for its machinery and automotive industries. The 
current structure of trade is usually criticized of being under-diversified (DEİK, 2004, 
Turkish Daily News, 2003, Oğuz, 2003). This could be interpreted as a sign of weak 
economic integration as such trade does not allow transfer of technology and development of 
mutual relationships. Rather it allows a flow of goods only, and economic integration does not 
deepen. Future development of trade should require diversification of trade through 
establishing intra-trade linkages within a variety of industries.  
 
Table.9 Composition of Bilateral Trade Between Turkey and Ukraine at 2004 * 
Turkey’s Exports to Ukraine 2004  Turkey’s Imports from Ukraine 2004 




Product Amount  in 
USD 
Share % 
Plastics  72,317,262  12.81  Iron and Steel  1,465,474,370  59.41 
Machinery and Boilers  52,366,746 9.28  Mineral  fuels  299,108,199  12.13 
Edible fruits  41,078,321  7.28  Fertilizers  169,243,930  6.86 
Electric ware  33,336,924  5.91  Inorganic Chemicals  111,659,239  4.53 
Salt, Sulphur, Cement etc.  31,581,678  5.60  Wood and Wooden furnitures  95,096,531  3.86 
Automotive and related  27,850,859  4.93  Fruits and oily seeds  61,720,724  2.50 
Soaps  23,464,539  4.16  By products of food industries  46,008,214  1.87 
Iron and steel ware  21,414,565  3.79  Grains  30,381,295  1.23 
Paper and paper products  19,257,309  3.41  Plastics  27,620,789  1.12 
Textiles 18,358,652  3.25  Organic  Chemicals  21,563,591  0.87 
Other 223,415,298  39.58  Other  138,894,906  5.63 
Total 564,442,150  100.00  Total  2,466,771,788  100.00 
Source: Haytaoğlu, 2005 
*There is a slight difference in trade amounts about year 2004 here and in the table above, even though both data are obtained 
by State Institute of Statistics of Turkey.   26
 
We see that Turkey has a net loss in the overall trade but benefits from trade of services. Bulk 
of the trade of services rely on distributive services like marine and air transportation. Turkey 
benefits from the marine transportation services which have the highest share in the exports of 
Turkey in services. Still, in overall trade, services share a very small portion of trade.  This is 
partially due to some restrictions in Ukraine, which are expected to be removed soon 
(Turkish Daily News, 2003).  
 









Share in Total 
Services Trade 
(%)  Balance 
TOTAL 42,174.95  100  16,298.4  100  25,878.10 
                 
DISTRIBUTIVE SERVICES (only transp.)  36,227.66  85.9  8,901.73  54.62  27,325.93 
Transportation Services               
- Marine Transportation  28,776.71  68.23  2,096.66  12.86  26,680.05 
 - Air Transportation  5,214.12  12.36  6,761.36  41.5   -1,547.24 
 -Rail Transportation  300.16  0.71  0.30  ~0.00  299.86 
 - Other Transportation Services  1,936.67  4.60  43.41  0.26  1,893.26 
JOURNEYS 2,818.16  6.68  3,342.01  20.51    -523.85 
COMMUNICATION SERVICES  893.22  2.12  762.04  4.67  131.18 
PRODUCER SERVICES  891.44  2.11  1,676.48  10.29  -785.04 
PRIVATE SERVICES, CULTURAL AND 
LEISURE SERVICES  4.61 0.01  1.55  ~0.00  3.06 
FORMAL SERVICES NOT INDICATED 
ELSEWHERE   97.24  0.23  1,189.04  7.30   -1,091.80 
REPAIRS 1,242.62  2.95  425.55  2.61  817.07 
Source: Haytaoğlu,  2005,  data by Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics 
 
Bilateral Investments 
Bilateral investments are key indicators of an emerging integration between trans-national 
regions as they demonstrate a deeper integration that enables transfer of capital, technology 
and intra-industry trade. For our case, evidence of mutual investments is one of the key issues 
for the emergence of regional integration zone.  
The structure of the mutual investments is rather one-sided here, where Turkish investments 
in Ukraine surpass the Ukrainian Investments in Turkey significantly. Still, both countries’ 
share in the foreign investments in the other represents only small shares. At the end of 2003, 
direct foreign investments from 114 countries accumulated in Ukraine amounted 6.6 billion 
USD, in which Turkey represented only 0,048 billion USD with 288 companies. Turkish 
companies in the 1990’es have started investing to newly independent states due to needs like 
investment diversification and the high inflation rate in the country. Companies that produced 
consumer goods and retailers preferred to start businesses all over in this geography, 
especially to key targets like capital cities as Moscow, Alma Aty and others.  
Ukraine’s investments in Turkey are neglectible regarding the size of the foreign investments 
in Turkey, with 4-5 companies around  a total investment of 5.3 million USD at 2004   27
(Embassy of Republic of Turkey to Ukraine in Kiev, 2005).  These companies operated in 
distributive services and shipping related activities, only.  
Recently, the fall of the inflation and better investment environment in Turkey has created a 
suitable atmosphere to invest locally. Recent rises of Ukraine’s exports shall also promote 
investments in Ukraine, thus we may expect a slow down in bilateral investments in both 
countries as they have become attractive locations themselves for investments.  
 
Table.11 Total Invesment Volume of Turkey in Ukraine 2002-2003                   
                                                                                    01.01.2003  01.01.2002 
Sector 








Total Investments of Turkey  38,1  100.0 36.9  100.0 
Extractory industries        
Agriculture, fishing, hunting and related business  1.4  3.67 1.29  3.5 
Transformative Industries        
Food and Agricultural products manufacturing industry  6.2  16.27 9.90  26.9 
Light industry (Textiles, wearing apparels, leather products) 0.5  1.31 0.50  1.4 
Machinery manufacturing industry  0.7  1.84 0.70  1.9 
Chemicals and petrochemicals industry  10  26.25 6.40  17.4 
Wood and related products manufacturing industry  0.7  1.84 0.60  1.6 
Cellulose, paper and imprinting industry   0.1  0.26 0.10  0.3 
Distributive Services        
Transportation   1.2  3.15 1.00  2.7 
Sale and repair of transportation vehicles   0.2  0.52 0.20  0.5 
Wholesale   5.7  14.96 5.00  13.6 
Retail   1.2  3.15 1.10  2.9 
Transformative Industries        
Construction   1.7  4.46 1.30  3.5 
Producer Services        
Financial services   7.7  20.21 7.70  20.9 
Social Services        
Otel and restaurants   0.6  1.57 0.60  1.6 
Personal Services        
Education – (social services)  0.2  0.54 0.50  1.3 
Source: Haytaoğlu,  2005,  data by Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics 
 
We see sharp raises in chemicals and petrochemicals industry, wholesale and repair while a 
sharp decline in the food and agricultural products manufacturing industry investments. 
Following news on firm level, the reason for the drop of food related industries is the 
unsatisfactory brewery investments, while the rise in chemicals industry is rather related on 
investments in detergents and soap industries.  
Obstacles in obtaining trans-national city level data on financial services limit our evaluation 
of bilateral relations between Istanbul and Odessa seriously. Up to date, capital transfers 
between Odessa and Istanbul are held through third country links. That introduces a serious 
barrier to regional integration as costs of producer services increase through indirect links.  
Another major obstacle to integration has been the incomplete fundamental changes in 
banking system in both countries. Though banking system is continually changing in Turkey,   28
in Ukraine financial system was still heavily under control of state until 2004. The law that 
enables foreigners to establish bank branches in Ukraine was in the agenda of the Parliament 
of Ukraine at 2003 (Embassy of Republic of Turkey to Ukraine in Kiev, 2005). The speech 
by Dolhov becomes important regarding this law (Turkish Daily News, 2003):  
 
•  Establishing and developing finance and credit mechanisms, particularly by 
setting up branches of Turkish banks in Ukraine and vise versa is very important 
for the improvement of our cooperation.  
 
A recent information is that Turkish banks are expected to start operation in Ukraine by 2006 
(Embassy of Republic of Turkey to Ukraine in Kiev, 2005). That would provide direct 
links within the region, decreasing costs of producer services for companies. These direct 
links will be provided by either Turkish or foreign banks, which are or will inherently 
represent multinational capital within their capital structures. 
 
c)  Istanbul and Odessa Integration  
To evaluate our assumption, we try to figure out the level of mutual investments within both 
city-regions, as an indicator of progressing economic integration. We also try to evaluate the 
mutual structure of economic relationships in manufacturing, services, transportation and 
tourism sectors between Turkey and Ukraine in the framework of the relations of Istanbul and 
Odessa where data is available. 
Mutual investments 
Foreign direct investment figures show us that basic actors in Odessa Region are US, UK and 
Switzerland, while other  actors in the nearby countries like Greece, Cyprus Lebanon, Turkey 
and Hungary enter Odessa through capital  relations with the USA (ABD and AUB, 2005).  
As Ukrainian investments in Turkey are not diversified and cover just a few companies, we 
can only evaluate the level of Turkish investments in Odessa. We observe a continuous 
increase in the number of Turkish companies in Odessa in the recent years. Odessa’s share 
has significantly increased by 2004 in terms of number of firms, but due to the retrieval of 
Turkish brewery investment by 2003, the amount of the investment in terms of USD has not 
changed significantly. We also observe a loss in the amount of Turkish investments in Odessa 
by 2005. Thus it is possible to say that Odessa experiences problems in further attracting 
Turkish investments. 
 
Table.12 Turkish Investments in Ukraine 
Number of Turkish Companies  Amount of Turkish Investment (‘000USD)*   
In Ukraine  In Odessa  Share of 
Odessa 
In Ukraine  In Odessa  Share of 
Odessa 
01.01.2005       49.231  4.773  9,6% 
01.01.2004 331  83  25%  47.426  5.814  12,26% 
01.01.2003 288  35  12%  37.807  3.850  10,18% 
01.01.2002 265  33  12,5%  36.761  5.554  15,13% 
Source: Deputy of Trade Embassy of Turkey to Ukraine in Kiev,2002,2003, and 2004 
*There are slight differences in the amount of investments in each report. We have used the latest information given in these reports.    29
Turkish companies do not only invest in Ukraine but also compete each other for the larger 
market beyond the country. As an example, Istanbul based soap and detergent companies 
could be given: EVYAP invested in Odessa – Illichevsk by 2003, while İstanbul based BETA 
started a joint company named ‘Olvia Beta Cleaning Products Company’ in Dnipropetrovsk 
recently  (KOSGEB, 2005). This competition shall be viewed as a direct result of the 
globalization (or, preferably, regionalization) of Turkish companies at the post 1990 period 
(Kapital, 2004).  
Though there is a slow down, further integration is to interest of Turkish investors.  Small and 
Medium Industry Development Organization of Turkey suggests that  Turkish investors 
should  not only invest in retail and wholesale but also invest in manufacturing sector 
(KOSGEB, 2005).  
 
Transportation and Communication 
What constitutes the basis of bilateral investments between two countries and two cities is the 
transportation links that enable them. About the same time TRACECA started, Istanbul and 
Odessa has signed the protocol for city twinning. Following the protocol, ferry lines were 
opened between Odessa and İllichevsk to Istanbul and Derince, which became one of the 
important marine links among others like those between Illichevsk – Samsun, Skadovsk -
Zonguldak,and Yevpatoriya - Zonguldak.  
An important fact is that the Ro/Ro – passenger line of Samsun-Illichevsk, Ro/Ro line of 
Zonguldak-Yevpatoriya and Zonguldak-Skadovsk, and the passenger line of Istanbul-Odessa 
and Derince(Izmit)-Illichevsk are all run by Turkish companies that are resident in Istanbul. 
Other companies in Ukraine are located in Odessa. Thus we may conclude that the 
concentration of distributive services in these cities indicate a level of mutual integration.  
 
Table.13 Some Examples of Headquarter Locations in Transportation Sector 
Link Company  City  Location  Where  Head 
Office is Located in 
Branch Office in Other 
country 
       
Samsun-Illichevsk  KİPTUR-BENE Istanbul  Aksaray,  Istanbul   
Istanbul-Odessa  KİPTUR-BENE Istanbul  Karaköy,  Istanbul   
Istanbul-Odessa  Vival-Marine Ukraine  Odessa   
Istanbul-Odessa  UKRFerry Shipping 
Company 
Ukraine  Sabanskiy Lane, Odessa 
Derince-Illichevsk  UKRFerry Shipping 
Company  
Ukraine  Sabanskiy Lane, Odessa 
Fındıklı- Istanbul (Batırail with 
Batı Nakliyat ve Ticaret A.Ş.) 
Derince-Illichevsk  Batı Nakliyat ve 
Ticaret A.Ş. 
Istanbul Fındıklı, Istanbul   




İşletmesi A.Ş.  Istanbul Altunizade,  Istanbul  
Currently about 30 enterprises with Ukrainian capital operate in Turkey, which mostly deal 
with services related to luggage trade and transportation of Ukrainian visitors to Turkey. 
Some of these companies are Aerosvit, Adriatic and Dniproavia in air transportation, Blasko, 
Inflot and Ukrrichflot in marine transportation(The General consulate of Ukraine in 
Istanbul, 2005), most of which operate through Istanbul according to our own research.    30
Odessa is highly connected to Istanbul, Moscow, Vienna, Warsaw and Budapest via daily air 
connections which is a consistent result with the above mentioned global city studies of 
Taylor and others  (2002a), Derruder and others (2003a,b) and Beaverstock and others 
(1999), showing that Odessa is a gateway within this larger  geography.  
Among services, strategic relations arise through trans-regional infrastructure as well. A 
strategic relation between Istanbul and Odessa stems from the 3500 km. fiberoptic connection 
between Italy, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia (ITUR). The Palermo-Istanbul, Istanbul-Odessa 
and Istanbul-Novorossisk submarine connections require further research as evidence of 
information flows between these countries, which would eventually lead to expansion of 
information related services within these cities.  
Last but not the least, a strong connection between Odessa and Istanbul is due to the Russia-
Turkey natural gas pipeline under construction currently.  Thus two cities are connected via 
multiple networks that cover passenger, goods and energy transportation and electronic 
communication.  
Tourism 
Tourism is a complex industry including  distributive, social and personal services and flow of 
people in an analytical perspective. Tourism may be related with both business links and 
cultural relations between countries. In our particular case of Turkey and Ukraine, both 
reasons provide the basis for tourism activity.  The now diminishing luggage trade was the 
main reason for touristic activities from Ukraine and other newly independent states in the 
1990’es (Geniş, 2004). One the other hand, Turkish citizen’s visits to these countries were 
merely by entrepreneurs who sought for business opportunities, thus smaller in size in terms 
of visitors.  
Dolhov (Turkish Daily News, 2003), points that amount of Ukrainian visitors are about 10 
times more than those visiting Ukraine, though Ukraine owns a variety of resort centres. A 
reason to this is probably the structure of trade currently. Another reason could be that Turkey 
is a main tourist destination, with well established tourism industry that dates back to 1969 
and new investments with high quality. Turkey is a main destination but not a departure for 
any country in Europe. Thus it seems difficult that there will be a balanced flow of tourists at 
the country scale.  
 
Table.14 Total number of foreign tourists that visit Istanbul 
Years  1990  1995  2000  2004 
Total number of foreign tourists that visit 
Istanbul 
1,121,931 2,007,384 2,420,541 3,473,185 
Total number of tourists that visit Turkey  5,389,308  7,726,886  10,428,153  17,516,908 
Share of Istanbul in Turkey (%)  20.8  26.0  23.21  19.82 
Source: State Institute of Statistics, Turkey 
Considering Odessa, though industries through foreign direct investments flourish, the main 
income of the region depends on recreation and tourism that developed in the Soviet Era 
according to Demchuk and Zelenyuk, (2005), and an increase in the number of visitors are 
expected through increasing per capita income of former Soviet Union countries’ citizens. 
According to ABD and AUB (2005), around 660.000 tourists travelled to Odessa region, of 
which 174.000 were foreigners. Majority of foreign tourists were from Russia, Germany,   31
Italy, Moldova, Belarus, Poland and Turkey. A third of these tourists either arrived by the 
cruisers using Danube and Dniper Rivers or ferries using the Black Sea.  
Istanbul attracts almost twenty times more foreign tourists than Odessa does. The logic of the 
tourism between these two cities depends on the travels of Ukrainians for luggage trade, and 
other reasons which we mentioned above, and the travels of Turkish businessmen who either 
have investments or trade relations with Ukraine. End of  the luggage trade would lead to a 
decrease in the number of Ukrainian visitors, while increasing number of Turkish investments 
in Ukraine would balance the tourist flow in the future. Yet, İstanbul remains as a receiver 
due to its function as a cultural and historical centre for the entire Black Sea region. This 
provides a strong reason for further regional integration that would support the emergence of 
a global integration zone. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We have tried to evaluate the emergence of a new global integration zone within the Black 
Sea Region in the case of Istanbul and Odessa. We may conclude that there is a progressive 
convergence in the political grounds between Turkey-Ukraine and Istanbul-Odessa, mainly in 
the framework of the global structures that are predominantly part of the Euro-Atlantic supra-
structure.  There is not much evidence of similarity in spatial development of Istanbul and 
Odessa, particularly due to political inclarity in Ukraine, especially on the decentralization of 
governance as a reflection of other major obstacles. There is evidence of economic and social 
integration, between Turkey-Ukraine and Istanbul-Odessa, which experiences slow 
development, and negative side effects like informal activities.  
As a conclusion we may argue that integration of two cities might heavily depend on the 
Ukrainian foreign and domestic policies, and the relations with supra-national structures like 
the World Trade Organization and EU. We may expect a progress in economic integration by 
the removal of trade barriers, where Istanbul and Odessa  would be direct beneficiaries as 
both production and transfer centres. Further decentralization in Ukrainian economy and local 
policy might lead to a re-population in Odessa Region, as happened in Istanbul after the 1980 
period. 
The people of the region has been suffering decreasing life quality, informal activities, 
increasing health problems (especially in Ukraine) and economic fluctuations worsening 
poverty. We believe such problems require solutions at the local level through strategic 
decisions of local governments.  Under such conditions of de-nationalization and 
decentralization of authority, local governments on both sides of the sea shall take 
responsibility about the negative side effects of neo-liberal globalization, while promoting 
regional integration. We may simply conclude that only economic integration would not be 
named a success, regarding the decreasing life expectancy among those who are most effected 
about the negative outcomes of this re-integration process. The success of this new (possible) 
global integration zone depends on its promise to provide a higher life quality, deeper mutual 
integration and local governments’ will to share responsibility.    32
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